On the local interaction of money and credit by Jin, Yi & Temzelides, Ted
ON THE LOCAL INTERACTION OF MONEY AND CREDIT1
Yi Jin








Keywords: Money and Credit, Local Matching
Abstract
We study the coexistence of monetary and credit transactions in a model where ex-
change is decentralized. Agents belong to different locations which are informationally
separated. The equilibrium mix of monetary and credit transactions is characterized
as a function of the frequency of meetings among agents from different locations.
Credit transactions take place only among a small set of “neighbors.” Monetary trades
emerge only if interactions with faraway locations are sufficiently frequent. Even in
that case, trades among nearby locations remain non-monetized.
1We thank, without implicating in any way, Dean Corbae, Narayana Kocherlakota, B. Ravikumar,
and Steve Williamson for comments and discussions. We also thank an associate editor and a referee
for providing comments that greatly improved exposition.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Transactions between people that meet frequently often involve neither a double
coincidence of wants nor the use of money but, rather, some form of “credit.” For ex-
ample, one person might be allowed to borrow some sugar from a next-door neighbor.
Instead of offering money, she implicitly agrees to help out a neighbor on a similar
occasion in the future. On the other hand, such favors might not be extended to
people that we meet only once. In this case, some form of payment, say money, is
offered on the spot in exchange for the good or service provided. Of course, people
that we meet often do not have to be located literally close to us. For example, people
that share certain interests or professional activities might meet frequently with each
other regardless of their own geographic location.
We study the coexistence of monetary and credit transactions in a model where
exchange is decentralized. We build a model based on the work of Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989). The decentralized way in which goods and information are exchanged
in this model makes it especially appropriate for the study of issues concerning early
economies in which centralized markets were scarce or non-existent. We add two
features to the standard setup. First, matching is not uniform but local. Each agent
belongs to a certain location (a village). People from neighboring locations are more
likely to meet each other than people from faraway places. Second, public record-
keeping of agents’ trading histories is available only within their own location.
We begin by studying conditions that guarantee that trade takes place only among
agents from nearby villages and only via the use of credit. In this case, money
has no possible welfare-improving role. Monetary trades might emerge only when
interactions with faraway villages become sufficiently frequent. In that case, both
means of payment coexist. Credit is used in trades among neighbors, whereas money
is used in trades among “strangers.”
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The idea that credit-like instruments are used in trades among agents with known
histories while currency is used in trades among relative strangers is not new. Townsend
(1989), for example, studies a model in which both types of transactions coexist. In
his model, as in ours, money and credit differ in their communication and record-
keeping aspects.2 Our work is most closely related to a number of papers that study
credit in a search-based setup starting with Diamond (1990). Kranton (1996) studied
the sustainability of reciprocal exchange. Shi (1996) and Corbae and Ritter (1997)
study money and credit in a search setup. Unlike them, we do not allow pairs of
agents to form ongoing relationships by staying together for more than one period.
Finally, Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) build on Kocherlakota (1998) and study
the coexistence of money and credit in an environment where public record-keeping
is incomplete because it is updated with a lag.
In our model, record-keeping is incomplete in the sense that it is available only
locally. We demonstrate that money is essential in facilitating trade among agents
who meet infrequently, and who lack access to each other’s trading histories. Our
main finding is that when no direct cross-location informational flow is possible,
money is useful in providing a partial substitute for it. Thus, while monetary and
credit transactions coexist, they differ in their scope. If an agent fails to perform a
credit transaction, he loses the opportunity to trade again with the village of the agent
that experienced the deviation. On the other hand, if an agent fails to produce in
exchange for money, he loses the opportunity to trade with agents from a large number
of villages in the near future. Thus, monetary exchange allows for the possibility
2In earlier work Lucas (1980) suggested that a friction involved in establishing one’s creditwor-
thiness might lead to the coexistence of money and credit transactions since, in that case, money
will economize on record-keeping costs. More recently, Lacker and Schreft (1996) study a model in
which “credit transaction costs,” which, unlike the cost of monetary trade, are assumed to increase
with distance, give rise to a coexistence of monetary and credit transactions. Our model could be
thought of as one providing micro-foundations for such transactions costs.
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of a “punishment” that is less severe but broader in scope than denial of future
credit. This feature of monetary exchange is shown to partially overcome the lack of
a cross-location informational flow. Our model allows us to characterize the fraction
of transactions that are monetized as a function of the cross-location informational
restrictions.
It is worth mentioning that while here we concentrate on the implications of local
matching and record-keeping for monetary theory, our setup might be useful in the
study of other issues that involve local interactions. For example, search in labor
markets often has a local feature, and reputation of certain goods and services is
often available only locally.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers an informal description of the model,
while Section 3 describes the environment. Section 4 presents the benchmark case
of uniform matching. Section 5 contains the main results. Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. AN INFORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
As certain aspects of our model are non-standard, we first describe the setup in-
formally. In the standard random matching model, credit cannot exist since agents
do not meet repeatedly, and there is no record-keeping of past trades. We amend
the standard model in two ways: by assuming that agents meet different sets of
agents with different probabilities, and by introducing record-keeping at the local
level. Although other interpretations are possible, we interpret the different meeting
probabilities as the result of the agents’ respective geographic distance from one an-
other. Agents populate villages that are symmetric, each consisting of a large number
(formally, a continuum) of agents. Agents are specialized in production and consump-
tion of goods and are assumed to be randomly matched in pairs in each period. Trade
is possible in the case where a potential producer meets with someone that likes his
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production good (hence called a single-coincidence meeting). The distribution of all
agents’ characteristics is the same across villages. With high probability, each agent
meets someone from his own village, and the probability of meeting another agent
decreases as the distance from the village that the agent belongs to increases. In
addition, we assume that each individual’s trading history is public information only
within the village where they belong, and only in regard to their meetings with agents
from that village.3
What are the likely methods of payment in this environment? One possibility is
that producers offer to produce without requiring immediate payment regardless of
the consumer’s location of origin. In the context of our model, we will identify such a
non-monetized exchange with a credit transaction. Suppose that if one agent deviates
from this implicit agreement, say by refusing to produce for someone from village j,
the deviation triggers a collective punishment to permanent no-trade between the
deviator and village j. One may think that this threat might induce an equilibrium
in which credit is used in all trades. However, consider an agent in a meeting with
someone from a very “faraway” village. The potential producer has a strong incentive
to deviate. The disutility of producing is suffered now, while the punishment will be
borne sometime in the distant future.4 Since the future is discounted, the producer
might refuse to produce. Our main result establishes conditions for the existence
of a critical distance (frequency of meetings) such that in a stationary equilibrium,
only credit transactions take place among close neighbors (people whose frequency of
3As we mentioned earlier, geographic distance is one possible reason why matching and record-
keeping are local, and other interpretations of the model are, indeed, possible. For example, one
could argue that academic economists are “close” to each other in the sense that they meet frequently
and share information, say in conferences, regardless of their actual geographic location. Our results
would apply under such alternative interpretations of the “distance” function.
4This requires that the close neighbors of the deviating producer remain unaware of his deviation.
Later we make assumptions that guarantee that this will be true in our setup.
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meetings is higher than a critical value), while only monetary transactions occur in
meetings between people from faraway places (people whose frequency of meetings is
lower than the critical value).
3. THE ENVIRONMENT
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite. The economy is populated by a con-
tinuum of agents of total measure 1. Agents are matched bilaterally in every period.
There is an (odd) number of villages denoted by j = 1, 2, ..., n, forming a partition of
the unit circle with a continuum of agents in each village. There is a finite number,
k ≥ 3, of perishable and indivisible consumption goods. Agents specialize in con-
sumption and production in a symmetric fashion. At the beginning of each period,
there is a [0, 1
k
] continuum of each type. Individuals of type i consume good i and
produce good i+1 (modulo k), where i = 0, ..., k− 1. The instantaneous utility from
consumption is u > 0. Production requires an effort that gives disutility e > 0, where
u > e. Agents maximize expected discounted utility, and the time discount factor is
β ∈ (0, 1). Because k ≥ 3, there is no double coincidence of wants. We assume that a
fractionM of agents each start with one unit of indivisible, storable, and intrinsically
useless fiat money. Current period money holdings are observable within a match.
We impose an upper bound on individual holdings; i.e., individuals can hold at most
one unit of currency or one unit of a good. This implies that, in meetings where there
is monetary trade, one unit of money is exchanged for one unit of good.5 Agents are
assigned to villages at the beginning of time. The initial distribution of all agents’
characteristics, including money holdings, is uniform across consumption types and
villages. We will concentrate on stationary equilibria that respect this symmetry.
5The indivisibility assumption is largely for simplicity. Introducing endogenous prices as in Shi
(1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) would complicate our analysis without qualitatively changing
the results.
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One difference between the environment of our model and the standard setup in
existing search models is in the matching technology. Matching here is not uniform
but local. Each agent is matched with an agent from his own village with probability
p0; he is matched with an agent from either of the two immediately neighboring
villages with probability p1, where p0 > p1 > p2 > . . ., etc. There is no loss of
generality in concentrating our analysis on a distinguished agent from a generic village,
j. Denote by d the distance between our generic village and any other village, j0; i.e.,
d = |j − j0|. Hence, pd stands for the probability that our distinguished agent is
matched with an agent from a d−order neighboring village, where P n−12d=0pd = 1.
Agents return to their village at the end of each period. We assume that the random
matching technology operates in two levels. First, in any given period each village is
randomly assigned to one and only one village (possibly to itself). Then, agents from
the matched villages are randomly matched in pairs. The role of this assumption is
explained later.
Another novel feature of our model is that agents from different villages cannot
exchange information regarding trading histories. This captures the feature that,
especially in early village economies, it was costly to have access to credit histories,
and these costs increased as a function of distance. A potential deviation experienced
by an agent from village j is automatically communicated to all agents in village j
by the agent that experienced the deviation and triggers a punishment to permanent
no trade with the deviating agent by all agents in village j.6 Of course, the deviator
has no incentive to reveal his deviation. Also, actions during meetings with agents
6Following common practice, we assume that a deviation triggers a punishment to the worst
“reasonable” equilibrium. In general, a lesser punishment requires a higher discount factor in order
to maintain the same composition of credit and monetary trades. In a different context, Cole and
Kehoe (1995) study a model of sovereign debt and demonstrate that multiple relationships and
spillovers across them can support debt through the threat of similar collective punishments.
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from other villages are not publicly observable in the deviator’s own village. The
assumption that agents from one village can meet with agents from only one other
village within a period ensures two features that are important for what follows:
(1) information about trading histories remains local and (2) there is no aggregate
uncertainty so that the model remains tractable.7
When two agents have a single-coincidence meeting, they simultaneously make a
trading proposal after they observe each other’s type, current money holdings, and
village of origin. The potential consumer has three choices: (1) to request production
without payment, (2) to offer money in exchange for production, and (3) to propose
no trade. The producer also has three choices: (1) to offer to produce requesting
no payment, (2) to request money in exchange for production, and (3) to propose
no trade. If the two proposals match, the resulting trades are realized. If they are
different, then a punishment is triggered.8
Consider our distinguished agent in a meeting with an agent from a village that is
d steps away. We denote by αd the probability with which an agent requests money
in exchange for production, and by md the probability that he offers money in order
to consume. Similarly, let gdMp,Mc and h
d
Mp,Mc
be the respective probabilities that an
agent produces requesting no payment and that he requests production offering no
payment when the producer’s and the consumer’s money holdings are given by Mp
and Mc, respectively. The remaining probability is assigned to the event that a no
trade proposal is made.
Of course, the punishment to permanent no-trade is arbitrary, and one could think
of several alternatives. The harshest possible punishment that a deviated-upon village
7Without this restriction in the matching technology, positive fractions of agents from any village
would meet with agents from all other villages. Thus, if one village is informed of a deviation and
triggers global autarky, this could lead to global autarky two periods after the deviation occurred.
8We ignore the case where the producer offers to produce requesting no payment while the
consumer offers money. This, of course, would never occur in equilibrium.
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could adopt is to revert to permanent autarky during all future meetings with all
villages.9 Even if this punishment is adopted, a long lag before it reaches the deviator
guarantees that the qualitative properties of our results still hold. On the other hand,
we could adopt the less harsh punishment of allowing monetary exchanges in future
meetings with a known deviator.10 As we mentioned earlier, this would complicate
the analysis without qualitatively changing the results.
We now describe the general value functions, special cases of which we use later. A
symmetric equilibrium consists of values for gdMp,Mc, h
d
Mp,Mc , α
d and md that satisfy
the two value functions below, and are such that gdMp,Mc = h
d
Mp,Mc
and αd = md. We
concentrate on the symmetric steady state value function of an agent from a generic
village j. We let V0 and V1 denote the value function of an agent with and without
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The first part of the value function describes the case of a meeting in which there is
9This punishment defines one end of the spectrum, but it is unattractive. For example, agents
in the deviated-upon village know the location of the deviator. It does not seem reasonable to
punish themselves by adopting autarky in meetings within the village, or in meetings with their
close neighbors, especially if the deviating agent’s village is “far away.”
10This is especially relevant since both the deviator and his partner might have an incentive
to perform a monetary trade instead of making no proposals. However, notice that, given our
mechanism, making no proposals in such a meeting remains an equilibrium. In fact, if we assume
an arbitrarily small cost of making a proposal, it is a strict equilibrium.
9
no coincidence of wants. The second part describes the case of a single coincidence
meeting as a producer and as a consumer, respectively, with an agent that has no
money holdings. In that case, our distinguished agent chooses whether to offer credit
and whether to receive credit, respectively. Finally, the third part describes the case
of a single coincidence meeting as a producer and as a consumer, respectively, with
an agent that holds money. In that case, our distinguished agent chooses whether to
offer credit or to offer to produce in exchange for his partner’s money holdings, etc.
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4. A BENCHMARK CASE - UNIFORM MATCHING
Our main focus is the study of a model where both record-keeping and matching
are local. In order to separate the role of these two assumptions, we first consider
the case where matching is uniform, while information about histories is available
only at the local level. Suppose there are n villages and pd = p = 1n , for all d. The
following proposition asserts that in this environment, money and credit payments
cannot coexist in a non-trivial way. More precisely, credit exchange across all meetings
can be supported as an equilibrium outcome for low values of n, while credit exchange
cannot be supported for high values of n.
Proposition 1 Suppose that β ∈ (0, 1). There is a unique n∗ such that if p ∈ ( 1
n∗ , 1),
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there exists a pure credit equilibrium, and money is not essential. If p ∈ (0, 1
n∗ ), there
exists no equilibrium with credit transactions.
The above follows as a Corollary of the main Proposition in the next section. The
intuition is simple. A deviation from offering credit triggers permanent no-trade
with the village of the deviated-upon agent. Producing implies a certain amount
of disutility that the producer suffers today. On the other hand, the potential cost
from the autarky punishment depends on the frequency with which the penalty is
experienced in the future. If the probability of meeting the same village is high
enough, the best response is to offer credit. Otherwise, the best response will be to
deviate. Since the meeting probabilities are equal, the result follows.11
5. MONEY AND CREDIT UNDER LOCAL MATCHING
In this section we derive our main proposition establishing conditions that guar-
antee the coexistence of monetary and credit transactions. Recall that the random
matching technology operates in two steps. First, a village is matched to any other,
including itself, with some probability. Then individual agent matches occur. We
first prove some preliminary results. The first Lemma asserts that the search econ-
omy in Kocherlakota (1998) follows as a special case of our setup if we shut down
all meetings across different villages (p0 = 1). In that case, each village is an iso-
lated economy under uniform matching, and a high discount factor guarantees the
existence of a credit equilibrium. No monetary arrangement can result in a higher
11In our model the severity of the punishment increases as the expected frequency of meetings
between two locations increases. What is important in general is that the expected value of the
potential punishment is high. This could be accomplished in other ways. For example, assuming
that matching probabilities are equal but that agents derive lower utility from consuming goods
produced by “far away” agents would create the same effect. We thank an anonymous referee for
suggesting this alternative.
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frequency of consumption than the credit equilibrium. This is because in a credit
equilibrium trade takes place in each single-coincidence meeting, while with money it
is also needed that in at least some meetings the consumer has money and the pro-
ducer does not. We will concentrate on the Pareto superior credit regime whenever
such a regime can be supported.
Lemma 1 Suppose that p0 = 1. There exist βC and βM with 0 < βC < βM < 1
such that for all β ∈ (βC , 1), a credit equilibrium exists, and for all β ∈ (βM , 1), a
monetary equilibrium exists. Welfare in the credit equilibrium is strictly higher than
in any equilibrium in which money is used.
Proof: We let V C be the value function under a credit regime, and we denote by
V M1 and V
M
0 the value functions of a money holding and a non-money holding agent,
respectively, under a monetary regime. In a credit equilibrium we have that V C =
u−e
k(1−β) > 0. In order for g
d = 1 to be the best response for a producer in a single
coincidence meeting where hd = 1, we need that −e + βV C ≥ 0, which implies that
β ≥ ek
ek+u−e ≡ βC. On the other hand, since u + βV C > 0, we have that hd = 1 is
the best response given gd = 1. That is, the credit equilibrium exists provided that
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For a monetary equilibrium to exist, we need that −e+βV M1 ≥ βV M0 . Solving for V M0
and V M1 and substituting, we have that the inequality holds if β ≥ ekek+(u−e)(1−M) ≡
βM . Average welfare in the monetary equilibrium is given by WM = (1−M)V M0 +
MV M1 . It is easy to see that W
M reaches the maximum, W
M






4k(1−β) , which is lower than average welfare in the credit equilibrium.
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The next Lemma asserts that the welfare cost from not being in a credit regime
increases in the expected frequency of meetings between two villages. In addition, a
sufficient condition is derived for credit transactions to be sustainable. Intuitively,
autarky implies an overall lower expected frequency of consumption. Thus, the higher
the frequency of meetings between two villages, the bigger the cost of reverting to
no trade. Since punishment becomes more painful, it is easier to support the credit
regime. Define pd ≡ ek(1−β)β(u−e) .
Lemma 2 Suppose that β is sufficiently high. Consider two villages that are matched
with probability pd. The difference between the value functions under credit and under
autarky between them increases in pd. Furthermore, if pd ∈ (pd, 1), all transactions
between the two villages use credit, while if pd ∈ (0, pd), there is no equilibrium with
credit transactions between the two.





sum of the matching probabilities with the villages that use credit (money) in meetings
with agents from j. Let pA be the sum of the matching probabilities of the villages that




0 , and V
A
1 stand for the
value functions under a credit regime and under autarky between our distinguished
agent and an arbitrary village j
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In order to support credit transactions between j and j
0
, we need that −e+ βV C0 ≥
βV A0 and −e+ βV C1 ≥ βV A1 . It is easy to check that
V C1 − V A1 = V C0 − V A0 = V C − V A =
pd (u− e)
k (1− β) , (9)
which is increasing in pd. The expressions for V C0 −V A0 and V C1 −V A1 are independent
of how agents in village j trade in meetings with agents from villages other than j0.
Using the first part and substituting pd(u−e)
k(1−β) for the difference V
C −V A, we have that
the incentive conditions are satisfied if pd ≥ ek(1−β)β(u−e) ≡ pd.
Notice that pd is decreasing in β. It equals zero when β = 1 and equals one when
β = βC . It is easy to show that pd increases in k and e, while it decreases in u
and β. As the probability of single coincidence becomes smaller, the welfare under a
credit regime is reduced. Thus, it becomes harder to support the credit equilibrium.
A higher production cost or a lower utility from consumption also makes the credit
equilibrium harder to support by reducing the value of consumption. On the other
hand, a higher discount factor helps to lower the critical probability.
The previous Lemma does not imply the existence of monetary trades. Producers
in meetings where credit cannot be supported will produce in exchange for money
provided that acquiring money sufficiently increases their probability of future con-
sumption. This requires that the producers will be able to use their earned money in
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the near future which, in turn, requires that a meeting with someone from a distant
village is likely.
The next Lemma gives sufficient conditions for all transactions in meetings between
agents from two villages to be monetary. Let B be the set of villages that are each
matched to our generic village, j, with probability less than pd, so that a credit
arrangement cannot be supported in meetings between agents from j and any of the
villages in B. Let pB be the probability that village j is matched to a village in B.
That is, pB =
P n−1
2
d=0pd, for pd < pd. Define pB ≡ ek(1−β)β(1−M)(u−e) .
Lemma 3 Consider two villages that are matched with probability lower than pd.
Provided that pB > pB, there exists an equilibrium where all transactions between the
two villages are monetary.
Proof: For β sufficiently high, a credit equilibrium can be supported in meetings
between agents from village j and any village in the complement of B. The value
functions for our distinguished agent can be written as





(1−M) (u+ βV0) + [1− 1
k
(1−M)]βV1} (10)






M (−e+ βV1) + (1− 1
k
M)βV0]. (11)
For a monetary equilibrium to exist in a meeting between agents from village j and
a village j
0 ∈ B, it is sufficient that −e+ βV1 > 0 + βV0. Solving for V0 and V1 and
substituting, we find that the inequality holds if pB ≥ ek(1−β)β(1−M)(u−e) ≡ pB.
We are now ready to state our main Proposition. A credit regime between two
villages can be supported if and only if the probability of a meeting between them is
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greater than pd. In the case where credit is not sustainable, monetary trades may be
supported if acquiring money sufficiently increases the probability of consuming in
the future; i.e., if a meeting with some other “faraway” village in the near future is
likely. To better understand the economic principle at work, consider a community of
people that trade almost exclusively among themselves via the use of credit. Suppose
that, in a very unlikely event, one of the residents meets a consumer from far away.
It will certainly not be individually optimal to produce for free for the stranger, but
what if the stranger offers money in exchange for production? Will the potential
producer accept the money and produce? If future meetings are expected to be only
with residents of the community, money will be of no use for a long time and will
be rejected. On the other hand, if meetings with strangers are frequent enough,
the producer can use money to finance consumption in the near future, and so he
will accept it. These observations define the existence of a critical probability that
separates the two types of transactions.
Proposition 2 Suppose that β ∈ (βC , 1). Transactions between village j and villages
that are matched to j with probability pd ∈ (pd, 1) use credit and, provided that the
probability of a meeting between j and a village in B is greater than pB, transactions
between j and villages that are matched to j with probability pd ∈ (0, pd) are monetary.
Proof: The sufficient conditions of β to support the credit regime and monetary
regime are given in our earlier discussion related to Lemma 1. The existence of a credit
regime when pd ∈ (pd, 1) and the non-existence of a credit regime when pd ∈ (0, pd)
follows from Lemma 2. The existence of a monetary regime when pd ∈ (0, pd) and
pB ∈ (pB, 1) follows from Lemma 3.
To illustrate this proposition, we present a simple example. Let u = 8, e = 2, k = 3,






. These are plotted in Figure 1. The
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Region I Region II Region III
pd=(1-β)/β
pB=2(1-β)/β
Fig. 1. Regions for pd, pB, β and Equilibria
Figure also demonstrates the regions of values for pd, pB, and β, and the equilibria
that are supported in these regions. We know that pd = 1 implies that β = β
C and
that pB = 1 implies that β = β
M . The two vertical lines in Figure 1 give rise to
three regions. Consider the generic village j matched with village j0 with probability
pd. In region I, autarky is the only equilibrium since the discount factor is too low
to support either credit or monetary transactions between the two villages. In region
II, if in addition pd lies above pd, all transactions between j and j
0 use credit. If pd
lies below, no trade takes place. Monetary transactions cannot be supported in this
region since pB is always less than pB (β is always less than β
M). In region III, if
in addition pd lies above pd, all transactions between j and j
0 use credit. If pd lies
below, there are two possibilities: autarky or monetary exchange depending on how
many other villages lie below pd. If pB is above pB, transactions between j and j
0 are
monetary; otherwise autarky prevails. Figure 2 gives the same information regarding
region III, in the (pd, pB) space.
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pd Credit
Autarky Monetary Exchange
Fig. 2. Regions for pd, pB and Equilibria, β = 0.8
6. CONCLUSIONS
We studied conditions leading to an equilibrium in which credit is used among
agents that meet each other frequently, while money is used in transactions among
those that meet only infrequently. Our main finding is that when no direct cross-
location informational flow is possible, money provides a partial substitute for it.
Thus, monetary and credit transactions coexist but differ in their scope.
It is hard to know the exact form of non-monetized transactions in early economies,
but observations of contemporary village economies provide some clues. In their study
of the financial structure of three villages in India, Lim and Townsend (1998) found
evidence consistent with credit functioning well within villages, while, at the same
time, external credit markets do not function as well, possibly due to a disadvantage
in information sharing. Perhaps the most appropriate interpretation of our model
is as a parable of a medieval village economy. Our main proposition suggests that
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money might “emerge” when, as a result of increased mobility, trades among people
from faraway locations become sufficiently frequent.
An important question concerns the general class of lattices that give rise to results
similar to ours. Indeed, if the location interpretation of the matching probabilities
is dropped in favor of a more general one, the assumption that agents are located
on a circle, or a torus, appears overly restrictive. We conjecture that versions of our
results will hold in more general lattices provided that there is a lag between the time
when a deviation occurs and when the resulting punishment reaches the deviator. A
formal study of this question, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
In future work we plan to introduce multiple locally-issued fiat objects and study
their circulation and redemption properties as a function of the local matching rule.
It would also be interesting to study monetary injections and price dispersion in
the context of a local interaction model with endogenous prices. In such a model,
newly injected money is likely to stay within a small set of locations in the short run.
In addition, locally issued money could circulate globally, but at a discount that is
proportional to the respective distance from the village of issuance.
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